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Introduction 
 
In January 2009, 75 countries created the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 
at a founding conference in Bonn. The creation of IRENA highlights the growing concern 
over the unfolding energy and climate crises. Fossil fuels provide 80 percent of global energy 
while being responsible for almost 60 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions.
1
 Demand for 
these fuels is set to grow, while the conventional reserves are dwindling, sparking fears of 
“peak oil.” In the wake of the recent shale gas and tight oil revolution, however, those fears 
have largely been replaced by concerns that fossil fuel abundance, not scarcity, is the most 
pressing problem, as it could lead us to overshoot our “carbon budget,” the amount of carbon 
dioxide that can be emitted without jeopardizing our chances of staying below two degrees of 
average global warming.
2
 Renewable energy sources have thus come into sight as attractive 
alternatives to fossil fuels not only because they are abundant and clean, but also because 
they can help to bring energy services to the poor, while stimulating economic growth and job 
creation. Furthermore, when used and produced in a sustainable manner, renewable energy 
can reduce the pressure on natural resources by helping to combat deforestation, 
desertification and biodiversity loss.
3
 
As of March 2013, an impressive total of 160 states have signed IRENA’s treaty and 
108 states, plus the EU, have ratified it. Remarkably, the new renewables organization is 
headquartered in Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a major oil and gas 
producer and a member of OPEC. Located in the UAE’s capital for now, the secretariat will 
eventually move to Masdar, the zero-carbon city that is being constructed in the desert of Abu 
Dhabi. In April 2011, the Assembly—the highest decision-making body within IRENA—held 
its first-ever meeting, marking the operational launch of the new agency. Although IRENA 
has only a modest annual core budget of some US$16 million in 2012, its creation in itself is 
significant. It is the first truly international organization that is hosted in the Middle East,
4
 the 
first international organization created under German leadership, and it is the first 
international organization that the US has joined in fifteen years. 
Strikingly, the leading states behind IRENA’s creation—Germany and, to a lesser 
extent, Spain and Denmark—are all founding members of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). A child of the oil agitation of the 1970s, the IEA has worked on renewables for over 
three decades. Although its membership is exclusively reserved for developed countries, the 
IEA is the closest we currently have to a World Energy Organization.
5
 Nevertheless, instead 
of strengthening the IEA’s existing capacities to work in the realm of renewable energy, 
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Germany and its partners decided to take the longer and more costly route of setting up a 
completely new organization with its own staff and headquarters. This begs two important 
theoretical questions: Why would member states of an international organization want to 
create an additional organization that would perform overlapping functions, thereby 
advancing the overall degree of fragmentation? And, relatedly, why would other members of 
the extant organization join the new institution? 
Such acts of duplication are not only counterintuitive, they also contradict 
institutionalist theory. Recognizing the high transaction costs of crafting new organizations, 
standard institutionalist theory would expect states to use or modify the extant organization—
for example by expanding its resources, capacity or constituency—rather than to create an 
organization de novo whenever a new problem arises. Duffield aptly expresses this idea: 
“given the various costs involved in creating institutions, actors seeking to pursue common 
interests in a new area may prefer, wherever possible, to make use of preexisting institutions 
rather than start from scratch.”6 The high costs of constructing new international 
organizations also differentiates de novo creation from related phenomena such as forum 
shopping or regime shifting, where actors transfer issues between existing institutional 
venues.
7
 
The young and burgeoning literature on institutional interplay and regime complexes 
also fails to solve the puzzle. Most of this literature focuses on the consequences rather than 
the origins of fragmented institutions.
8
 The most notable exception is Young, whose work on 
the politics of institutional linkages has directed attention to the strategic uses of regime 
formation.
9
 In contrast to regime theory’s long-standing emphasis on the “stickiness” of 
institutions, Young argues that “nothing is self-evident or automatic about the choice of 
arenas for regime formation.”10 He asserts that these choices should be understood as 
“products of organizational imperatives on the one hand and calculation of actor interests on 
the other.”11 Yet, despite Young’s foundational work, still very little is known about the 
process of when, why and how states deliberately diverge from a certain institutional path 
and establish new institutions that overlap with existing ones.
12
 
Heeding the call by Zelli and van Asselt for more theory-driven analyses of 
institutional complexity,
13
 this article provides an explanation for the central puzzle based on 
domestic preferences and the capture of institutions. Viewed through this lens, IRENA was 
part of an institutional hedging strategy instigated by domestic political actors in Germany, 
Spain and Denmark to counter the IEA’s allegedly supportive stance toward the fossil and 
nuclear energy industries. The findings of this article suggest that, depending on the domestic 
preferences of a set of member states that have the capability to create international 
institutions, the transaction costs associated with institutional reform may surmount those of 
institutional creation. These insights help to understand the sources of dyadic institutional 
overlap and fragmentation. 
Although the chief purpose of the article is to contribute to theory development, the 
case study in itself also advances research in a critical subfield of global environmental 
governance, namely energy sustainability. IRENA is the first major international organization 
that is set up with the prime objective to navigate and speed up the transition to more 
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sustainable energy sources. By focusing on a transformation of the energy sector, it tackles 
head-on the root cause of some of the world’s major environmental problems such as air 
pollution, acid rain, and climate change. In that respect, IRENA differs from the large body of 
international rules that has been adopted so far to manage the plethora of energy-related 
environmental externalities, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Even as those environmental treaties 
affect the energy sector, they do not lead to a radical departure from our current energy path. 
IRENA intends to do just that; yet, to date, the agency has attracted only scant scholarly 
attention,
14
 even within the emerging global energy governance literature.
15
 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I explain why the creation of 
additional institutions is highly unlikely according to conventional institutionalist thinking. In 
the third section, I develop two hypotheses that explain why, when and how actors could 
nevertheless diverge from the path and establish new institutions instead of using or changing 
existing ones. In the fourth section, I offer a process-tracing account of the case study. The 
fifth section engages the hypotheses with this evidence in an effort to interpret the 
observations and illustrate the practical validity of the proposed ideas. Examining only one 
case study precludes any general claims, but it does allow me to demonstrate the plausibility 
of the argument. 
 
Why Creating Overlapping Institutions is Difficult 
 
For the purposes of this article, international institutions may be defined as “explicit 
arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or 
authorize behavior.” 16 Creating overlapping international institutions is difficult, first and 
foremost, because institutions are difficult to establish in general. The presence of 
complementary interests between states is in itself insufficient to explain why institutions are 
formed. For realist-inspired writers, it takes the presence of a hegemonic state that is willing 
to take the necessary steps for new institutional arrangements to come into being. Others 
point out that regime creation may also be spurred by the pressures of a severe and sudden 
crisis.
17
 The UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, for example, could not have gained the 
political momentum necessary if it were not for the end of the Second World War and the 
supply of leadership by the US. The same logic seems to apply to energy organizations, with 
the IEA having been created in reaction to the oil crisis of the 1970s and the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) being an indirect product of the break-up of the Soviet Union.
18
 The fact that it 
usually takes a “transformational” or “after victory” moment for new regimes to come into 
being means that institutional creation does not occur very often. 
Standard neoliberal-institutionalist theory further posits that international institutions, 
once established, are persistent and robust. Most famously, Keohane contends that 
“international regimes are easier to maintain than to construct.”19 In his view, states are 
inclined to stick with the arrangements they have, recognizing the high transaction costs of 
negotiating new ones. What makes bargaining over new institutions so costly is that it 
“involves strategic delay in reaching agreement, the investment of leaders’ time, and the risk 
of their prestige.”20 Therefore, rational actors are generally expected to modify existing 
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institutions to new circumstances, instead of abandoning them and erecting new institutions 
from scratch whenever a new cooperation problem emerges.
21
 
Besides the transaction-cost argument, institutionalists also point to the mechanism of 
path dependence as an explanation for institutional stasis. Within institutionalized 
environments, there are several mechanisms of institutional reproduction at work that keep 
things moving along the same path. Institutions lock in vested interests, create sunk costs and 
generate increasing returns.
22
 The dynamic of increasing returns highlights the fact that the 
costs of switching from one institutional venue to another will tend to increase markedly over 
time. New institutions entail high fixed or start-up costs and they exhibit considerable 
learning effects. These costs can be avoided by simply working through existing 
organizations. Even when those extant institutions are nowhere near efficient or optimal to 
address a certain cooperation or coordination problem, states may stick to them anyway, for 
maintaining the status quo is an easy and low-cost option and states do not always behave as 
perfectly rational, utility-maximizing actors. As long as an existing regime performs essential 
functions passably well, state leaders are likely to engage in “satisficing” behavior.23 
The proliferation of international institutions further raises the barrier to newcomers in 
the “institutional market.” Over the past couple of years, the global institutional architecture 
has become markedly thicker and more densely populated than ever before, including in the 
sphere of energy.
24
 This implies that, when states are faced with either new problems that 
warrant international cooperation or with long-standing ones that have acquired more 
salience, they cannot start designing solutions from a “clean institutional slate.”25 Regimes 
rarely emerge ex nihilio or out of chaos but “they are built on one another.”26 Rising 
institutional density increases the chance that a new issue can be framed in such a way that it 
fits into an existing institutional arrangement. 
Finally, institutionalist theory suggests that the existence of an institution can 
encourage further delegation of tasks. Applying the concept of “economies of scale” to the 
establishment of regimes, Keohane contends that, once a regime has been established, each 
additional issue could be included under the regime at a lower marginal cost.
27
 This 
mechanism of increasing returns to scale is the reason why we can expect to observe ever 
more extensive regimes across the board. It also explains why new specific agreements tend 
to be nested within existing regimes. 
An interesting example of such nesting is the International Partnership for Energy 
Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), which was created by the G8 countries and their emerging 
partners in around the same period as IRENA. Like in the area of renewables, many 
international organizations were already engaged in the field of energy efficiency, so IPEEC’s 
creators had to decide where they would house the new partnership. Eventually, IPEEC was 
created as a nested institution within the IEA. More precisely, IPEEC’s secretariat is hosted at 
the IEA’s headquarters in Paris, but it has a separate budget and is not accountable to the 
IEA’s Governing Board. In other words, the creation of IPEEC proceeded along the lines 
predicted by institutionalist theory. This makes the creation of IRENA even more puzzling: 
why was a new institution on energy efficiency embedded within the IEA while another one, 
which emerged in the same period and was dedicated to renewable energy, was created 
outside of it? 
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 An Alternative Perspective: Institutional Capture and Hedging 
 
I depart from the premise that, rather than being prompted by purely functional imperatives 
or the need to solve a collective action problem, the migration of a governance site to an 
outside institution is likely to be the result of dissatisfaction with the outcomes under the 
existing arrangement.
28
 Member states that are dissatisfied with an existing organization—
states that I label “challengers”—have basically two options: they can “voice” (attempt to 
reform the organization); or, they can “exit” (withdraw from the organization).29 Given the 
high costs involved in exit, as discussed in the previous section, voice is the default option for 
challengers. I argue that their strategy changes when an international organization is captured 
by particular states or interest groups—a category of actors that I label “defenders.” 
The term “capture” is borrowed from Mansfield.30 When there is an actor or coalition 
of actors that is able to influence the distribution of benefits and costs among the members of 
an institution, and the institution appears to be impermeable to change, that institution may 
said to be captured. The concept is akin to Stigler’s theory of “regulatory capture,” which 
posits that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefits.”31 
International organizations could be captured by a powerful state or a group of 
states.
32
 Alternatively, international regulatory institutions could also be captured by 
particularistic interests, such as private firms, lobbyists, or sectoral organizations—whether 
they operate purely at the domestic level or transnationally.
33
 Or, international agencies could 
be captured by particular principled beliefs, ideologies or world views. The Bretton Woods 
institutions, for example, have long been bastions for neoliberal economic reforms, as 
exemplified by the Washington Consensus. Here, I will not extend the notion of institutional 
capture to the active role of ideas but focus instead on capture by states and interest groups. 
Ideational cleavages do come into play, albeit strictly within this actor-centric framework. 
For analytical purposes, what matters is not only whether an institution is actually 
captured or not, but whether it is perceived as such in the eyes of relevant actors. Even if an 
institution favors certain interest groups or states, as long as it is not perceived as captured, 
institutional capture has no explanatory value for subsequent behavior. While perceptions at 
the state level matter, equally important is how institutions are perceived by domestic actors, 
because “international cooperation turns on domestic politics.”34 When the domestic politics 
in a member country turn against an international institution, that state may attempt to set up 
a “countervailing institution,” defined as an institution created with the purpose of hedging 
against an extant institution. It is these domestic preferences that weaken the importance of 
the transaction-cost argument. Moravcsik has argued in a similar vein that, absent domestic or 
transnational support, institutions will not be sticky.
35
 The underlying assumption here is that 
states do not necessarily behave as unitary actors, but that state preferences are shaped by 
dominant domestic interests. 
Of course, dissatisfaction alone is not sufficient to explain the emergence of 
overlapping institutions. Inspired by Kingdon, I hypothesize that two additional scope 
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conditions need to be met before a countervailing organization is created.
36
 First, the coalition 
of dissatisfied states has to have the capability to create a new institution on its own. For 
example, it does not suffice that the Maldives are dissatisfied with the global climate regime 
for them to be able to create a rival organization to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
37
 Second, this same set of states needs to believe 
that the creation of a new institution is the best solution to the problem at hand. This 
awareness could grow, for example, out of the failure of iterative reform efforts within the 
extant institution. 
This leads me to a first hypothesis, which posits that when an international institution 
is captured and has lost domestic support in a (group of) powerful member state(s), the latter 
will attempt to create a countervailing institution. 
Needless to say, “challenger” states who seek to build coalitions to establish 
countervailing institutions are bound to face stiff opposition from the “defender” states and 
bureaucrats that prefer the old institutional order. The defenders will try to block substantial 
changes in the organization’s mandate and internal functioning, while retaining the incumbent 
forum as the focal point for the particular purview that is enshrined in its mandate. This 
means that they will also try to block any effort directed at creating another institution that 
could rival with the original institution or encroach upon its turf. 
Should a countervailing institution be established anyway, however, those defender 
states may revise their strategies, especially if the new institution develops into a credible 
complement to the extant organization. This is the case if third-party states believe that they 
are better off by joining the new institution, for example, because it lowers transaction costs 
and provides information.
38
 Furthermore, the new institution could provide a rallying point 
that empowers and aligns domestic political forces in different states around the purpose of 
supporting the new institution.
39
 Symbolic reasons may matter as well. As the number of 
countries ratifying an environmental treaty increases, other countries may increasingly 
perceive the treaty as legitimate and adopt it themselves.
40
 
Whatever the motives of these third-party states, the bottom line is that, to the extent 
that the countervailing organization gathers support, the defender states will come under 
pressure to join the new organization they initially opposed. Despite their preference for the 
original status quo, defender states may then find it rational to partake in the new 
organization. Faced with a fait accompli, it makes sense for them to jump the bandwagon and 
have a say in the new organization’s design and activities, rather than to stay outside and risk 
seeing the new institution develop into a direction that is even farther away from their own 
preferences. 
My second hypothesis hence claims that when a credible countervailing institution is 
created, states that prefer the institutional status quo ex ante will come under pressure to join 
the new institution. 
 
Case Description 
 
The Road to IRENA 
 
The plans for an international agency dedicated to renewables preceded IRENA’s creation by 
many years. The first multilateral deliberations on renewable energy date back to the early 
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1960s.
41
 The issue was also addressed in the Brandt Report (1980), and the UN organized a 
major international conference on renewable energy in Nairobi in 1981. This conference 
examined the role of alternative energy sources not only in light of the oil shocks of the 
1970s, which had severely hit the fragile economies of the third world, but also in response to 
the “other energy crisis” of that period, namely the rapid exhaustion of fuel wood as an 
energy source. No real progress was made though, and a proposal to create a special energy 
body within the World Bank was shelved due to opposition from the incoming Reagan 
administration in the US.
42
 
One person has been trying to put the issue back onto the agenda since the 1990s: the 
late German politician Hermann Scheer.
43
 Scheer was a member of the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) in Germany and has been a member of the German Parliament, the Bundestag, 
from 1980 until his unexpected death in October 2010. He has been president of two NGOs 
that have long campaigned for IRENA. In 1990, Scheer pleaded for the establishment of an 
International Solar Energy Agency. In the following months and years, he tried to sell his idea 
by approaching the UN Secretary-General, the US Senate, and the European Commission, 
but all in vain. In 2001, he came up with a modified proposal and presented a Memorandum 
for the Establishment of IRENA. 
As a member of the executive committee of the SPD, Scheer introduced the demand 
to create IRENA into the government program of the SPD for the federal elections in the 
summer of 2002. At the initiative of Hans-Josef Fell, a member of parliament for the German 
Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), the Green Party associated itself with this demand. In 
the elections, the governing coalition of the SPD and the Greens retained a narrow majority 
and continued in government with Gerhard Schröder as chancellor. In the new coalition 
agreement of October 2002, Scheer and Fell managed to include a commitment to launch an 
initiative for the establishment of IRENA. 
At the same time, the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development had taken place 
in Johannesburg, from 26 August to 4 September 2002. German hopes for a strong resolution 
on the promotion of renewable energy quickly faded away in Johannesburg. In the wake of 
the failed negotiations, a group of countries came together at the end of the summit to found 
the Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition (JREC), a coalition of the willing to promote 
international cooperation on renewable energy. As a follow-up, Germany organized an 
international renewables conference in Bonn, in June 2004. Remarkably, the political 
declaration, which was adopted unanimously by high-level government representatives from 
154 countries in Bonn, did not mention IRENA even once. The Bonn conference was the 
starting point of a series of international renewable energy conferences that have been held in 
Beijing (2005), Washington (2008), and Delhi (2010). 
According to Scheer, the JREC grouping “was not meant to be taken seriously”44 and 
the Bonn renewables conference was a “squandered opportunity.”45 He considered the 
adherence to the “UN consensual spirit” to be one of the principal reasons for these failures, 
besides opposition from established institutions such as the “UN organizations and the World 
Bank, [which] are opposed to any agency like IRENA, simply on grounds of institutional 
competition.”46 Indeed, the IEA claims to “have pushed back IRENA two or three times” 
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before it was actually established.
47
 Meanwhile, the IEA remained mired in sclerosis and 
proposals to reform its governance structure or to ramp up its budget for renewable energy 
were all defeated.
48
 
Having learned from the Johannesburg and Bonn failures, the German government 
changed its tactics in January 2007 and initiated a series of bilateral talks with governments 
all over the world to get their support for establishing IRENA. Three special ambassadors 
were appointed for this task. At the 2008 renewable energy conference in Washington, 
Germany for the first time formally presented a concrete proposal for IRENA to other 
participating governments. Two preparatory conferences were held in Germany and Spain in 
2008 and IRENA was finally established on January 26, 2009. The founding conference in 
Bonn, Germany, was attended by more than 120 national delegations from around the world; 
75 of them became signatory states. 
 
IRENA’s Institutional Set-up and Functions 
 
IRENA has three main organs: an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat. The Assembly is 
the supreme organ of the agency, which has the final word over all important decisions, 
including the adoption of the budget and the work program, the amendment of the Statute, 
and the appointment of the Director-General. It is composed of all member states, plus the 
EU, and meets once a year. Each member is attributed one vote and decisions on matters of 
substance are taken by consensus or near-consensus, that is, with no more than two members 
objecting.
49
 The Council consists of at least 11 but no more than 21 representatives of the 
members, elected for a term of two years by the Assembly. It convenes every six months and 
prepares the draft agenda for the Assembly. Within the Council, substantial decisions can be 
taken by a majority of two-thirds of the members. The Secretariat, finally, is entrusted with 
implementing the agency’s work program and is headed by a Director-General who has a 
four-year office term. 
From January 2009 until July 2010, when IRENA’s statute entered into force, the 
signatory states gathered in the Preparatory Commission, an interim body to negotiate the 
agency’s structures and initial work program. In June 2009, during the second session of the 
Preparatory Commission, it was decided that the Secretariat would be located in Masdar City, 
the prestigious low-carbon project under construction outside of Abu Dhabi. Once finished, 
the city will rely entirely on solar power and other renewable energy sources. At the same 
meeting, a French official, Hélène Pelosse, was elected as interim Director-General. 
The choices for Masdar and Pelosse were clearly a disappointment for Germany. 
Hermann Scheer, who pioneered the idea of IRENA, had hoped that Bonn, which already 
hosts the UNFCCC secretariat, would become the headquarters and that he himself would be 
nominated to become IRENA’s first Director-General. However, the German government had 
refrained from nominating him because it feared his candidacy would interfere with Bonn's 
application to host IRENA’s headquarters.50 This was obviously a miscalculation on the part 
of the German government because in the end it got neither the Secretariat nor the Director-
General. Moreover, some German officials suspected France of trying to win the top job 
inside the renewables organization so that it could move IRENA toward being a promoter of 
all low-carbon technologies—including nuclear energy.51 To sugar the pill, Bonn was elected 
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to host IRENA’s Centre of Innovation and Technology, while Vienna became the Agency’s 
Liaison Office for cooperation with other international organizations, most notably UNIDO, 
the IAEA and OPEC. 
The choice for Abu Dhabi as the headquarters’ location was the result of an 
impressive diplomatic lobby campaign that the UAE had set up, especially toward African 
countries.
52
 Moreover, the UAE promised to invest massively in IRENA. While Germany 
only offered some US$11 million, the UAE offered no less than US$136 million over the first 
six years. In addition, the UAE pledged to cover the entire costs for the logistics of the new 
agency so that the member states’ contributions could be directly used for the payment of 
salaries and to finance the implementation of its activities.
53
 The Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development also promised an amount of US$50 million each year, for the first seven years, 
to finance renewable energy projects in developing countries that are recommended by 
IRENA. 
IRENA’s overall goal is to “promote the widespread and increased adoption and the 
sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy.”54 In Article III of its Statute, a non-
exhaustive list of renewable energy sources is presented: bioenergy, geothermal energy, 
hydropower, ocean energy, solar energy, and wind power. According to its statute, IRENA, 
among other things, conducts policy analysis and advice, improves technology transfer, offers 
capacity building, provides advice on financing, and stimulates research.
55
 IRENA is not able 
to enact binding decisions on its member states, nor does it act as a development bank. 
 
Early Leadership and Budgetary Problems 
 
The first two years after the signing of IRENA’s treaty were very turbulent. Less than 18 
months after being elected as interim director-general, Hélène Pelosse stepped down on 
October 19, 2010. In an interview, Pelosse accused the UAE of pressurizing her to resign 
because she took to make gender parity a high priority at the new agency. Moreover, she 
publicly accused the UAE government of intimidation by intruding into her home, bugging 
her phone and office, and searching her baggage.
56
 
Just a few days before Pelosse’s resignation, Scheer passed away after suffering a 
heart attack. In some interviews right before his death, Scheer had defended Pelosse and 
stated that IRENA’s administrative committee, a body mandated to help set up the agency, 
had obstructed her in her work. However, an anonymous member of IRENA’s administrative 
committee, rebuked these accusations and said that Pelosse had made several missteps, such 
as putting on the website that she is opposed to carbon capture and storage, as well as nuclear 
energy.
57
 
A number of member states, both developed and developing, were also dissatisfied 
with what they saw as the “financial mismanagement” by Pelosse and her failure to put into 
practice “good accounting standards.”58 As a result, they withheld the financial support they 
had promised. Among these countries, the US (which had promised about US$3 million) and 
Japan (which had promised close to US$2.2 million) stood out as the largest defectors.
59
 In 
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January 2010, the Preparatory Commission had adopted a budget of US$14 million, but by 
June only about US$5 million had been paid. The agency had to downsize its programs and 
freeze all expenditures in June 2010.
60
 Eventually, these budgetary problems were rectified, 
largely because the UAE stepped in with a large amount of additional cash.
61
 In October 
2010, a new interim Director-General was appointed, Adnan Amin, with broad support from 
the membership. 
 
Explaining the Observed Institutional Dynamics 
 
Venue Selection 
 
At the moment of IRENA’s creation, there were a lot of alternative institutional homes in 
which the new institution could have been nested. The most obvious alternative to creating a 
new body would have been to reform the IEA, which had been working on renewables for 
years. In 1999, the IEA had created a renewable energy unit to provide support to the 
Working Party on Renewable Energy Technologies, which was itself created in 1982 as an 
advisory body on renewable energy. Moreover, the agency has maintained a “policies and 
measures” database on renewable energy since 2004, operated a small dozen of Implementing 
Agreements on specific renewable energy technologies, and renewable energy has been a part 
of its data collection efforts more generally. In the eyes of IRENA’s founding fathers, 
however, the IEA was not an appropriate venue. Indeed, as one interlocutor described it, “a 
reform of the IEA was never really considered, either out of practicality or out of ideology.”62 
On the practical side, clearly, there were some obstacles to an enhanced IEA role in 
renewables, most notably that the IEA’s activities are largely limited to the OECD countries, 
that its renewable energy work is underfinanced and understaffed, and that it does not have a 
wide expertise in training, capacity-building and technical assistance toward developing 
countries. In the eyes of some observers, though, these practical obstacles could have easily 
been overcome.
63
 For example, IRENA could have been nested within the IEA in the same 
way as the IPEEC. Or, the IEA’s renewable energy unit could have been upgraded and given 
more human and financial resources from the core budget. 
The functional argument that IRENA’s creators have used to justify their creation of a 
standalone organization could even be used against them. Former IEA Director Claude 
Mandil believes that:  
 
organizations that focus on small pieces of the overall energy puzzle are not good 
because agencies dedicated to one energy type become lobbyist agencies. The 
problem is not in the IEA’s view to be pro or against renewables but to solve the 
energy security and climate change issues. In my view, renewables should be 
considered as a tool, not as an objective per se.
64
 
 
A more important reason for establishing IRENA as a standalone organization seems 
to be of political nature. In the eyes of the German government, the existing “political 
structures often put renewable energy at a disadvantage compared to other energy sources.”65 
It strongly believed that renewable energy needed an “additional push” because it lagged 
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62. Interview member state representative #3, 26 April 2011. 
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64. Interview with Claude Mandil, Executive Director of the IEA from 2003 to 2007, Paris, 9 March 2010. 
65. German Federal Government 2008, 7. 
behind fossil and nuclear energy in terms of market structures, technology development, and 
established industries.
66
 Berlin was convinced that the IEA’s mandate was too broad to ensure 
that the agency could provide a visionary leadership on renewable energy. The German 
government judged that the IEA’s analyses tended to focus on large-scale energy supply, 
“without offering advice on adapting markets to more decentralized forms of energy” and 
“without fully reflecting the potential of renewable energy.”67 
More specifically, German, Danish and Spanish interest groups and NGOs were 
dissatisfied with the IEA because they saw this agency as a lobby for fossil fuels and nuclear, 
underestimating the potential of renewable sources of energy. In early 2009, the Energy 
Watch Group, an international coalition of politicians and scientists headquartered in 
Germany, accused the IEA of blocking a global switch to renewables. It pointed out that, in 
1998, the IEA had predicted that global wind electricity generation would total 47.7 gigawatt 
by 2020. The target was already reached in 2004, sixteen years earlier than predicted. In 
2002, the IEA revised its estimate to 104 gigawatt by 2020, a capacity that was exceeded by 
the summer of 2008.
68
 To the authors of the report and to Scheer, these wrong projections 
evidenced that the IEA “leaves no stone unturned when it comes to emphasizing the long-
term indispensability of nuclear and fossil energy.”69 
In line with my first hypothesis, it was the perception of the IEA as a captured 
institution that helped to spur a coalition of like-minded states to create a countervailing 
organization, whose framing of the problem was beneficial to their own interests. Among the 
actors most eager to establish IRENA an ulterior motive might have been to advance the 
interests of the strong renewable energy companies they host. Within Germany, Denmark, 
and Spain, there are strong corporate interests in the renewable energy sector. As Table 1 
illustrates, no less than seven of the top ten wind turbine manufacturers (in order of 
production) in 2007 were based in one of the three leading states behind the creation of 
IRENA. This same set of countries also figures in the top ranks with regard to other 
renewable energy indicators, including grid-connected solar power and investment in new 
renewable energy capacity.
70
 
 
Table 1 
The Top Ten Wind Turbine Manufacturers in Order of Production (2007)
71
 
 
Rank Company Country of origin IRENA coalition 
1 Vestas Denmark Yes 
2 Gamesa Spain Yes 
3 GE US No 
4 Enercon Germany Yes 
5 Suzlon India No 
6 Siemens Germany Yes 
7 Nordex Germany Yes 
8 Repower Germany Yes 
9 Acciona Spain Yes 
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10 Goldwind China No 
 
Momentum 
 
Creating an outside institution is risky because the “defender states” are likely not to join it. 
This risk was clearly present for IRENA because, initially, it failed to mobilize support from 
some key countries. Conspicuously absent from the 75 original signatories were G8 countries 
Canada, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the US; and global South leaders such as Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico and South Africa. 
Only drop by drop did many G20 countries decide to join, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
China’s announcement in January 2013 that it plans to join IRENA confirms this pattern. 
Today, 26 out of 28 IEA member countries have signed onto IRENA’s statute. The two 
remaining IEA countries are Canada and Hungary, although it is clear that within both 
countries political forces exist that are supportive of IRENA. Apart from these countries, 
some of the most remarkable remaining absentees are Brazil and Russia. The key here, 
however, is not to explain why a few major countries have remained outside of IRENA but to 
explain why so many of them have joined the agency in spite of their initial reticence. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Ratifications of IRENA’s Statute (up until January 2013)72 
 
This new momentum is indeed remarkable, especially if contrasted with the lack of 
progress at the 2002 Johannesburg summit and the 2004 Bonn renewables conference. Part of 
the explanation is that the German government changed its strategy. In 2004, the German 
government deemed it was more important to have everybody on board—even the Bush 
administration and OPEC—and produce a correspondingly meaningless text. As from 2008, 
Berlin changed its tactics and forged a coalition of the willing instead of trying to create a 
bland consensus. This strategy proved successful and other countries were persuaded to join. 
One reason is that, confronted with a fait accompli, many governments decided that it was 
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better to enter the negotiations now and have a say in the new agency’s institutional set up, 
rather than joining later and having no say in these matters at all. Indeed, right before he 
passed away in October 2010, Scheer had said: “some countries appear to have joined 
IRENA mainly to influence its program, while maintaining a minimalist view of the role for 
renewable energy in solutions to climate change.”73 
Another explanation for the increased momentum is posturing. The US, for example, 
“was never in favor of IRENA and saw no reason to create another international 
organization,” which it regarded as “a product of zealous European political posturing.” Yet, 
eventually, Washington did become a member because “coming off the Bush administration it 
was a fairly inexpensive way to demonstrate a different approach of the Obama 
Administration to lower carbon options.”74 The change in the US position towards IRENA 
illustrates the symbolic value of creating and joining international institutions, serving as a 
signal of state leaders towards domestic or foreign audiences. 
In short, we can observe a pattern that is consistent with my second hypothesis. 
Developed countries that initially opposed IRENA, such as the US and the UK, have 
eventually succumbed to pressures to join the renewables agency. They did so for a variety of 
reasons: the fact that IRENA was going ahead anyway, the entry of a growing number of 
third countries, and the symbolic and bargaining benefits of joining the new agency.  
The large number of states that have joined IRENA since 2009, for various reasons 
and with different expectations, explains the apparent paradox in the agency’s institutional 
design: despite the rejection of the UN as a proper institutional home for IRENA, the new 
agency’s institutional design is characterized by a preference for UN-type rules and 
structures. While many of the criticisms of previous renewable energy institutions had been 
that they lack teeth and implementation, IRENA has adopted statutes that entrench it in a 
system prone to sclerosis, relying on consensus (or near-consensus) in its main decision-
making bodies despite its large membership base. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has analyzed the phenomenon whereby states create overlapping institutions, thus 
advancing the overall degree of fragmentation. It has also proposed an explanation for it, 
based on the capture of institutions by particular states or interest groups. The capture of an 
institution could spur the creation of a countervailing organization if there exists a sufficiently 
strong coalition of dissatisfied states in which the incumbent institution has lost domestic 
support. The creation of a credible countervailing institution generates pressure on the 
outsiders to join the new institution to influence the bargaining process, to satisfy a domestic 
constituency, and/or to reap reputational payoffs. 
The question remains whether IRENA will have real teeth, besides being a talking-
shop and cheerleader for renewables. After a rocky start, the seasoned UN official Amin has 
put the agency back on track since he took office in late 2010.
75
 Since IRENA has only been 
a fully functioning organization for about two years, the jury is still out on whether it will 
succeed in lowering information asymmetries, building political consensus, and helping 
developing countries leapfrog the fossil fuel-based economic development model. These are 
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probably the kinds of functions that IRENA’s creators had in mind when they pushed for a 
new multilateral initiative on renewable energy. 
However, such a functionalist argument is insufficient to explain the emergence of 
IRENA because it fails to grasp why Germany and others were willing to pay the significant 
start-up costs involved in creating a standalone organization, particularly given that the IEA 
could be retooled to take on the same tasks that IRENA is performing now. Indeed, the push 
to create IRENA can be viewed partly as a symbolic action, taken for internal German 
political reasons, with the organization given a headquarters for prestige reasons in Abu 
Dhabi. In that respect, the case study challenges the strict functionalist understanding of 
institutions as it reveals that not all institutions are created with the sole purpose of reducing 
transaction and information costs. Politicians sometimes create international institutions on 
“pet” issues for purely domestic reasons, or as a signal to international audiences, rather than 
for addressing a collective action problem, adding to the overall fragmentation of the global 
institutional architecture. 
The case study serves as a reminder that international organizations are not neutral 
vehicles but embody certain interests and principled beliefs. Examining the driving forces 
behind the creation of overlapping institutions can thus be revealing of the contentious issues, 
the politics, and the ideological cleavages that surround those institutions and the areas they 
operate in. The creation of a specialized renewable energy agency raises the specter of 
(further) institutional fragmentation in global energy governance along sectoral lines, with 
each sector having its own international institution. Sectoral institutions are often captive to 
their constituencies and tend to acquire a “booster-club mentality.”76 Every sectoral grouping 
thus tends to defend “its” fuel of choice. IRENA could become no less guilty of this dynamic 
than the IEA or the IAEA. 
This does not mean that IRENA and the IEA
 
will necessarily be locked in parochial 
turf wars and ideological battles over energy policy. Indeed, there are signs that they are 
moving into the direction of “cooperative fragmentation.”77 For one thing, in January 2012, 
the heads of both agencies have signed a partnership agreement and have agreed to 
collaborate closely on issues like data collection.
78
 For another, there are tentative signs that 
the creation of IRENA has served as a salutary shock to the IEA. In September 2008, the IEA 
upgraded its renewable energy “unit” into a “division,” staffed by 9 full-time analysts, as a 
sign that the agency is aware of the urgent need to accelerate the large-scale penetration of 
renewable energy technologies into the market to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. In 
addition, the IEA has expressed itself unusually positive in two recent reports on solar 
energy.
79
 While it is difficult to establish a causal connection, it might be that the mere 
existence of IRENA has made the IEA more responsive to demands for change as it has 
opened up opportunities for forum-shopping. 
More research on inter-institutional learning and institutional interaction is needed to 
examine the nature of such causalities.
80
 Altogether, the findings of this article raise important 
questions for the future of global energy and climate governance and call for new research 
into institutional capture, competing organizations, and the symbolic benefits of cooperation. 
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